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Abstract. Modern architectures provide weaker memory consistency
guarantees than sequential consistency. These weaker guarantees allow
programs to exhibit behaviours where the program statements appear
to have executed out of program order. Fortunately, modern architec-
tures provide memory barriers (fences) to enforce the program order
between a pair of statements if needed. Due to the intricate semantics
of weak memory models, the placement of fences is challenging even for
experienced programmers. Too few fences lead to bugs whereas overuse
of fences results in performance degradation. This motivates automated
placement of fences. Tools that restore sequential consistency in the pro-
gram may insert more fences than necessary for the program to be cor-
rect. Therefore, we propose a property-driven technique that introduces
reorder-bounded exploration to identify the smallest number of program
locations for fence placement. We implemented our technique on top of
Cbmc; however, in principle, our technique is generic enough to be used
with any model checker. Our experimental results show that our tech-
nique is faster and solves more instances of relevant benchmarks than
earlier approaches.
1 Introduction
Modern multicore CPUs implement optimizations such as store buffers and in-
validate queues. These features result in weaker memory consistency guarantees
than sequential consistency (SC) [20]. Though such hardware optimizations of-
fer better performance, the weaker consistency has the drawback of intricate
and subtle semantics, thus making it harder for programmers to anticipate how
their program might behave when run on such architectures. For example, it is
possible for a pair of statements to appear to have executed out of the program
order.
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Consider the program given in Fig. 1a. Here, x and y are shared variables
whereas r1 and r2 are thread-local variables. Statements s1 and s3 perform
write operations. Owing to store buffering, these writes may not be reflected
immediately in the memory. Next, both threads may proceed to perform the
read operations s2 and s4. Since the write operations might still not have hit the
memory, stale values for x and y may be read in r2 and r1, respectively. This
will cause the assertion to fail. Such behaviour is possible with architectures that
implement Total Store Order (TSO), which allows write-read reordering. Note
that on a hypothetical architecture that guarantees sequential consistency, this
would never happen. However, owing to store buffering, a global observer might
witness that the statements are executed in the order (s2, s4, s1, s3), which results
in the assertion failure. We say that (s1, s2) and (s3, s4) have been reordered.
Fig. 1b shows how the assertion might fail on architectures that implement
Partial Store Order (PSO), which permits write-write and write-read reordering.
Using SC, one would expect to observe r2 == 1 if r1 == 1 has been observed.
However, reordering of the write operations (s1, s2) leads to the assertion failure.
Architectures such as Alpha, POWER and SPARC RMO even allow read-write
and read-read reorderings, amongst other behaviours. Fortunately, all modern
architectures provide various kinds of memory barriers (fences) to prohibit un-
wanted weakening. Due to the intricate semantics of weak memory models and
fences, an automated approach to the placement of fences is desirable.
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
– We introduce ReOrder Bounded Model Checking (ROBMC). In ROBMC, the
model checker is restricted to exploring only those behaviours of a program
that contain at most k reorderings for a given bound k. The reorder bound
is a new parameter for bounding model checking that has not been explored
earlier.
– We study how the performance of the analysis is affected as the bound
changes.
– We implement two ROBMC-based algorithms. In addition, we implement
earlier approaches in the same framework to enable comparison with ROBMC.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
and a motivating example for ROBMC. Sections 3 and 4 provide preliminaries
and describe earlier approaches respectively. ROBMC is described in Section 5.
Related research is discussed in Section 6. Experimental results are given in
Section 7. Finally, we make concluding remarks in Section 8.
2 Motivation and Overview
There has been a substantial amount of previous research on automated fence
insertion [3,4,7,11,17,23,24]. We distinguish approaches that aim to restore se-
quential consistency (SC) and approaches that aim to ensure that a user-provided
assertion holds. Since every fence incurs a performance penalty, it is desirable
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x = 0, y = 0;
s1 : x = 1;
s2 : r1 = y; ‖ s3 : y = 1;s4 : r2 = x;
assert(r1 == 1||r2 == 1);
(a)
x = 0, y = 0;
s1 : x = 1;
s2 : y = 1; ‖ s3 : r1 = y;s4 : r2 = x;
assert(r1! = 1||r2 == 1);
(b)
x = 0, y = 0, w = 0, z = 0;
s1 : z = 1;
s2 : p1 = w;
s3 : x = 1;
s4 : r1 = y;
‖
s5 : w = 1;
s6 : p2 = z;
s7 : y = 1;
s8 : r2 = x;
assert(r1 == 1||r2 == 1);
assert(p1+ p2 >= 0);
(c)
Fig. 1: (a) Reordering in TSO. (b) Reordering in PSO. (c) A program with
innocent and culprit reorderings
to keep the number of fences to a minimum. Therefore, a property-driven ap-
proach for fence insertion can result in better performance. The downside of the
property-driven approach is that it requires an explicit specification.
Consider the example given in Fig. 1c. Here, x,y,z,w are shared variables
initialized to 0. All other variables are thread-local. A processor that implements
total store ordering (TSO) permits a read of a global variable to precede a write
to a different global variable when there are no dependencies between the two
statements. Note that if (s3, s4) or (s7, s8) is reordered, the assertion will be
violated. We shall call such pairs of statements culprit pairs. By contrast, the
pairs (s1, s2) and (s5, s6) do not lead to an assertion violation irrespective of the
order in which their statements execute. We shall call such pairs innocent pairs.
A tool that restores SC would insert four fences, one for each pair mentioned
earlier. However, only two fences (between s3, s4 and s7, s8) are necessary to
avoid the assertion violation.
Some of the earlier property-driven techniques for fence insertion [3, 22] use
the following approach. Consider a counterexample to the assertion. Every coun-
terexample to the assertion must contain at least one culprit reordering. If we
prevent all culprit reorderings, the program will satisfy the property. This is
done in an iterative fashion. For all the counterexamples seen, a smallest set
of reorderings S is selected such that S has at least one reordering in common
with each of the counterexamples. Let us call such a set a minimum-hitting-set
(MHS ) over all the set of counterexamples C witnessed so far. All the weaken-
ings in MHS are excluded from the program. Even though MHS may not cover
all the culprit reorderings initially, it will eventually consist of culprit pairs only.
Since one cannot distinguish the innocent pairs from the culprit ones a priori,
such an approach may get distracted by innocent pairs, thus, taking too long to
identify the culprit pairs.
To illustrate, let us revisit the example in Fig. 1c. Let us name the approach
described above Fi (Fence Insertion). Let the first counterexample path pi1 be
(s2, s1, s6, s5, s4, s7, s8, s3). The set of reorderings is {(s1, s2), (s3, s4), (s5, s6)}.
Method Fi may choose to forbid the reordering of {(s1, s2)}, as it is one of
the choices for the MHS . Next, let pi2 = (s1, s2, s6, s5, s4, s7, s8, s3). The set
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of reorderings for this trace is {(s3, s4), (s5, s6)}. There are multiple possible
choices for MHS . For instance, Fi may choose to forbid {(s5, s6)}. Let pi3 =
(s2, s1, s5, s6, s8, s3, s4, s7). As the set of reorderings is {(s1, s2), (s7, s8)}, one of
the choices for the MHS is {(s1, s2), (s5, s6)}. Recall that (s1, s2) and (s5, s6)
are innocent pairs. On the other hand, (s3, s4) and (s7, s8) are culprit pairs.
Fi may continue with pi4 = (s1, s2, s5, s6, s4, s7, s8, s3). The set of reorderings
in pi4 is {(s3, s4)}. An adversarial MHS would be {(s1, s2), (s3, s4)}. Let pi5 be
(s1, s2, s6, s5, s8, s3, s4, s7). The reorderings {(s5, s6), (s7, s8)} will finally lead to
the solution {(s3, s4), (s7, s8)}. In the 6th iteration Fi will find that the program
is safe with a given MHS . For brevity, we have not considered traces with re-
orderings (s1, s4) and (s5, s8). In the worst case, considering these reorderings
might lead to even more traces.
As we can see, the presence of innocent pairs plays a major role in how fast
Fi will be able to find the culprit pairs. Consider a program with many more
innocent pairs. Fi will require increasingly more queries to the underlying model
checker as the number of innocent pairs increases.
To address the problem caused by innocent pairs, we propose Reorder Bounded
Model Checking (ROBMC). In ROBMC, we restrict the model checker to ex-
ploring only the behaviours of the program that have at most k reorderings
for a given reordering bound k. Let us revisit the example given in Fig. 1c
to see how the bounded exploration affects the performance. Assume that we
start with the bound k = 1. Since the model checker is forced to find a coun-
terexample with only one reordering, there is no further scope for an innocent
reordering to appear in the counterexample path. Let the first trace found be
pi1 = (s1, s2, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s3). There is only one reordering {(s3, s4)} in this
trace. The resulting MHS will be {(s3, s4)}. Let the second trace be pi2 =
(s1, s2, s5, s6, s8, s3, s4, s7). As the only reordering is {(s7, s8)}, the MHS over
these two traces would be {(s3, s4)(s7, s8)}. The next query would declare the
program safe. Now, even with a larger bound, no further counterexamples can
be produced. This example shows how a solution can be found much faster with
ROBMC compared to Fi. In the following sections, we describe our approach
more formally.
3 Preliminaries
Let P be a concurrent program. A program execution is a sequence of events.
An event e is a four-tuple
e ≡ 〈tid , in, var , type〉
where tid denotes the thread identifier associated with the event and in denotes
the instruction that triggered the event. Instructions are dynamic instances of
program statements. A program statement can give rise to multiple instructions
due to loops and procedure calls. stmt : Instr → Stmt denotes a map from
instructions to their corresponding program statements. The program order be-
tween any two instructions I1 and I2 is denoted as I1 <po I2, which indicates
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that I1 precedes I2 in the program order. The component var denotes the glob-
al/shared variable that participated in the event e. The type of the event is
represented by type, which can either be read or write. Without loss of gener-
ality, we assume that P only accesses one global/shared variable per statement.
Therefore, given a statement s ∈ Stmt, we can uniquely identify the global vari-
able involved as well as the type of the event that s gives rise to. Any execution
of program P is a sequence of events pi = (e1, . . . , en). The i
th event in the
sequence pi is denoted by pi(i).
Definition 1 A pair of statements (s1, s2) of a program is said to be reordered
in an execution pi if:
∃i∃j ((ei.tid = ej .tid) ∧ (pi(i) = ei) ∧ (pi(j) = ej)
∧ (j < i) ∧ (ei.in = I1 ∧ ej .in = I2)
∧ (I1 <po I2) ∧ (stmt(I1) = s1 ∧ stmt(I2) = s2))
According to Defn. 1, two statements are reordered if they give rise to events
that occurred out of program order.
Definition 2 We write ROA(s1, s2) to denote that an architecture A allows the
pair of statements (s1, s2) to be reordered.
Different weak memory architectures permit particular reorderings of events.
– Total Store Order (TSO): TSO allows a read to be reordered before a
write if they access different global variables.
ROtso(s1, s2) ≡ (s1.var 6= s2.var) ∧ (s1.type = write ∧ s2.type = read)
– Partial Store Order (PSO): PSO allows a read or write to be reordered
before a write if they access different global variables.
ROpso(s1, s2) ≡ (s1.var 6= s2.var) ∧ (s1.type = write)
Partial-order based models for TSO, PSO, read memory order (RMO) and
POWER are presented in detail in [7].
Definition 3 Let C be a set consisting of non-empty sets S1, . . . , Sn. The set
H is called a hitting-set (HS) of C if:
∀Si∈CH ∩ Si 6= ∅
H is called a minimal-hitting-set (mhs) if any proper subset of H is not a hitting-
set. H is a minimum-hitting-set (MHS) of C if C does not have a smaller hitting-
set. Note that a collection C may have multiple minimum-hitting-sets.
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4 Property-driven Fence Insertion
4.1 Overview
In this section we will discuss two approaches that were used earlier for property-
driven fence insertion. We will present our improvements in the next section.
For a program P of size |P |, the total number of pairs of statements is |P |2.
Since the goal is to find a subset of these pairs, the search space is 2|P |
2
. Thus,
the search space grows exponentially as the size of the program is increased.
An automated method for fence insertion typically includes two components:
(1) a model checker M and (2) a search technique that uses M iteratively in
order to find a solution. We assume that the model checker M has the following
properties:
– M should be able to find counterexamples to assertions in programs given a
memory model.
– M should return the counterexample pi in form of a sequence of events as
described in Section 3.
– For a pair of statements (s1, s2) for which ROA(s1, s2) holds, M should be
able to enforce an ordering constraint s1 ≺ s2 that forbids the exploration
of any execution where (s1, s2) is reordered.
4.2 Fence Insertion using Trace Enumeration
Alg. 1 is a very simple approach to placing fences in the program with the help
of such a model checker. The algorithm is representative of the technique that
is used in Dfence [24]. Alg. 1 iteratively submits queries to M for a counterex-
ample (Line 7). All the pairs of statements that have been reordered in pi are
collected in SP (Line 11). To avoid the same trace in future iterations, reordering
of at least one of these pairs must be disallowed. The choice of which reorderings
must be banned is left open. This process is repeated until no further error traces
are found. Finally, computeMinimalSolution(φ) computes a minimal set of pairs
of statements such that imposing ordering constraints on them satisfies φ.
Termination and soundness Even though the program may have unbounded
loops and thus potentially contains an unbounded number of counterexamples,
Alg. 1 terminates. The reason is that an ordering constraint s1 ≺ s2 disallows
reordering of all events that are generated by (s1, s2). The number of iterations
is bounded above by 2|P |
2
, which is the size of the search space. Soundness is
a consequence of the fact that the algorithm terminates only when no coun-
terexamples are found. A minimal-hitting-set (mhs) is computed over all these
counterexamples to compute the culprit pairs that must not be reordered. Since
every trace must go through one of these pairs, it cannot manifest when the
reordering of these pairs is banned. The number of pairs computed is minimal,
thus, Alg. 1 does not guarantee the least number of fences. One can replace the
minimal-hitting-set (mhs) with a minimum-hitting-set (MHS) in order to obtain
such a guarantee.
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Algorithm 1 Trace Enumerating Fence Insertion (Te)
1: Input: Program P
2: Output: Set S of pairs of statements that must not be reordered to avoid assertion failure
3: C := ∅
4: S := ∅
5: φ := true
6: loop
7: 〈result, pi〉 :=M(Pφ)
8: if result = SAFE then
9: break
10: end if
11: SP := GetReorderedPairs(pi)
12: if SP = ∅ then
13: print Error: Program cannot be repaired
14: return errorcode
15: end if
16: φ := φ ∧
 ∨
(s1,s2)∈SP
s1 ≺ s2

17: end loop
18: S := computeMinimalSolution(φ)
19: return S
Algorithm 2 Accelerated Fence Insertion (Fi)
1: Input: Program P
2: Output: Set S of pairs of statements that must not be reordered to avoid assertion failure
3: C := ∅
4: S := ∅
5: φ := true
6: loop
7: 〈result, pi〉 :=M(Pφ)
8: if result = SAFE then
9: break
10: end if
11: SP := GetReorderedPairs(pi)
12: if SP = ∅ then
13: print Error: Program cannot be repaired
14: return errorcode
15: end if
16: C := C ∪ {SP}
17: S := MHS(C)
18: φ :=
∧
(s1,s2)∈S
s1 ≺ s2
19: end loop
20: return S
8 Saurabh Joshi and Daniel Kroening
4.3 Accelerated Fence Insertion
Alg. 2 is an alternative approach to fence insertion. The differences between
Alg. 1 and Alg. 2 are highlighted. Alg. 2 has been used in [22,23] and is a variant
of the approach used in [3]. Alg. 2 starts with an ordering constraint φ (Line 5),
which is initially unrestricted. A call to the model checker M is made (Line 7)
to check whether the program P under the constraint φ has a counterexample.
From a counterexample pi, we collect the set of pairs of statements SP that have
been reordered in pi (Line 11). This set is put into a collection C.
Next, we compute a minimum-hitting-set over C. This gives us one of the
smallest sets of pairs of statements that can avoid all the counterexamples seen so
far. The original approach in [22] uses a minimal-hitting-set (mhs). The ordering
constraint φ is updated using the minimum-hitting-set (Lines 17–18). Alg. 2 tells
the model checker which reorderings from each counterexample are to be banned
at every iteration, which is in contrast to Alg. 1. Alg. 2 assumes that an assertion
violation in P is due to a reordering. If a counterexample is found without any
reordering, the algorithm exits with an error (Lines 12–15). Finally, the algorithm
terminates when no more counterexamples can be found (Lines 8–10).
Termination and soundness The argument that applies to Alg. 1 can also be
used to prove termination and soundness of Alg. 2. In addition, the constraint
φ generated is generally stronger (i.e. φAlg. 2 → φAlg. 1) than the constraint
generated by Alg. 1. Thus, for the same sequence of traces, Alg. 2 typically
converges to a solution faster than Alg. 1.
5 Reorder-bounded Exploration
Alg. 2 can further be improved by avoiding innocent reorderings so that culprit
reorderings responsible for the violation of the assertion are found faster.
As discussed in Section 2, Alg. 2 requires many iterations to converge and
terminate in the presence of innocent reorderings. The reason is that the model
checker may not return the simplest possible counterexample that explains the
assertion violation due to reorderings. In order to address this problem, we need
a model checker M ′ with an additional property as follows:
– M ′ takes Pφ and k as inputs. Here, Pφ is the program along with the ordering
constraint φ and k is a positive integer. M ′ produces a counterexample pi for
Pφ such that pi has at most k reorderings. If it cannot find a counterexample
with at most k reorderings, then it will declare Pφ safe.
With a model checker M ′, we can employ Alg. 3 to speed up the discovery of
the smallest set of culprit pairs of statements. The steps that differ from Alg. 2
in Alg. 3 are highlighted. Alg. 3 initializes the reordering bound k (Line 5) to
a given lower bound K1. The model checker M
′ is now called with this bound
to obtain a counterexample that has at most k reorderings (Line 9). When the
counterexample cannot be found, the bound k is increased according to some
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Algorithm 3 ROBMC
1: Input: Program P , lower bound K1 and an upper bound K2
2: Output: Set S of pairs of statements that must not be reordered to avoid assertion failure
3: C := ∅
4: S := ∅
5: k := K1
6: φ := true
7: while k ≤ K2 do
8: loop
9: 〈result, pi〉 :=M ′(Pφ, k)
10: if result = SAFE then
11: break
12: end if
13: SP := GetReorderedPairs(pi)
14: if SP = ∅ then
15: print Error: Program cannot be repaired
16: return errorcode
17: end if
18: C := C ∪ {SP}
19: S := MHS(C)
20: φ :=
∧
(s1,s2)∈S
s1 ≺ s2
21: end loop
22: k := increaseStrategy(k)
23: end while
24: return S
strategy denoted by increaseStrategy (Line 22). Note that collection C and the
ordering constraint φ are preserved even when k is increased. Thus, when k is
increased from k1 to k2, the search for culprit reorderings starts directly with the
ordering constraints that repair the program for up to k1 reorderings. Only those
counterexamples that require more than k1 and fewer than k2 culprit reorderings
will be reported. Let us assume that P does not have any counterexample with
more than kopt reorderings. If kopt is much smaller than k, the performance of
Alg. 3 might suffer due to interference from innocent reorderings. If the increase
in k is too small, the algorithm might have to go through many queries to reach
the given upper bound K2. It can be beneficial to increase the bound k by a
larger amount after witnessing a few successive SAFE queries, and by a smaller
amount when a counterexample has been found recently.
Building M ′ A model checker M ′ that supports bounded exploration can be
constructed from M as follows. For every pair (s1, s2) that can potentially be re-
ordered, we introduce a new auxiliary Boolean variable a12. Then, a constraint
¬a12 ↔ (s1 ≺ s2) can be added. This allows us to enforce the ordering con-
straint s1 ≺ s2 by manipulating values assigned to a12. For a given bound k,
we can enforce a reorder-bounded exploration by adding a cardinality constraint∑
aij ≤ k. This constraint forces only up to k auxiliary variables to be set to
true, thus, allowing only up to k reorderings.
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Algorithm 4 ROBMC-Et
1: Input: Program P , lower bound K1 and an upper bound K2
2: Output: Set S of pairs of statements that must not be reordered to avoid assertion failure
3: C := ∅
4: S := ∅
5: k := K1
6: φ := true
7: terminate := false
8: while k ≤ K2 and terminate = false do
9: loop
10: 〈result, pi, ψ〉 :=M ′(Pφ, k)
11: if result = SAFE then
12: if not safeDueToBound(k, ψ) then
13: terminate := true
14: end if
15: break
16: end if
17: SP := GetReorderedPairs(pi)
18: if SP = ∅ then
19: print Error: Program cannot be repaired
20: return errorcode
21: end if
22: C := C ∪ {SP}
23: S := MHS(C)
24: φ :=
∧
(s1,s2)∈S
s1 ≺ s2
25: end loop
26: k := increaseStrategy(k)
27: end while
28: return S
Optimizing Alg. 3 Even when the correct solution for the program is found,
Alg. 3 has to reach the upper bound K2 to terminate. This can cause many
further queries for which the model checker M ′ is going to declare the program
SAFE . To achieve soundness with Alg. 3, K2 should be as high as the total
number of all the pairs of statements that can be potentially reordered. This
leads to a very high value for K2, which may reduce the advantage that Alg. 3
has over Alg. 2.
We can avoid these unnecessary queries if the model checker M ′ produces a
proof whenever it declares the program Pφ as SAFE . This proof is analogous to
an unsatisfiable core produced by many SAT/SMT solvers whenever the result
of a query is unsat.1 With this additional feature of M ′, we can check whether
the cardinality constraint
∑
aij ≤ k was the reason for declaring the program
SAFE . If not, we know that P is safe under the ordering constraint φ irrespective
of the bound. Therefore, Alg. 3 can terminate early as shown in Alg. 4. The
difference between Alg. 3 and Alg. 4 is highlighted in Alg. 4. The model checker
M ′ now returns ψ as a proof when Pφ is safe (Line 10). When M ′ declares Pφ
as safe, Alg. 4 checks whether the bound k is the reason that Pφ is declared safe
1 SAT solvers such as MiniSat [13] and Lingeling [10] allow to query whether a given
assumption was part of the unsatisfiable core [14].
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(Line 12). If not, the termination flag is set to true to trigger early termination
(Line 13).
Termination and soundness Let the program P have counterexamples with
up to kopt culprit reorderings. If the value of the upper bound K2 for Alg. 3 and
Alg. 4 is smaller than kopt, there might exist traces that the algorithms fail to
explore. For soundness, the value of K2 should thus be higher than kopt. Since
kopt is generally not known a priori, a conservative value of K2 should be equal
to the total number of pairs of statements for which reordering might happen
(ROA(s1, s2) is true). Termination is guaranteed due to finiteness of the number
of pairs of statements and K2.
6 Related work
There are two principal approaches for modelling weak memory semantics. One
approach is to use operational models that explicitly model the buffers and
queues to mimic the hardware [1, 2, 5, 11, 18, 23, 24]. The other approach is to
axiomatize the observable behaviours using partial orders [6, 7, 9]. Buffer-based
modelling is closer to the hardware implementation than the partial-order based
approach. However, the partial-order based approach provides an abstraction of
the underlying complexity of the hardware and has been proven effective [6].
Results on complexity and decidability for various weak memory models such as
TSO, PSO and RMO are given in [8].
Due to the intricate and subtle semantics of weak memory consistency and
the fences offered by modern architectures, there have been numerous efforts
aimed at automating fence insertion [3, 4, 7, 11, 15, 17, 22–24]. These works can
be divided into two categories. In one category, fences are inserted in order to
restore sequential consistency [4,7,11]. The primary advantage is that no external
specification is required. On the downside, the fences inferred by these methods
may be unnecessary.
The second category are methods that insert only those fences that are re-
quired for a program to satisfy given properties [2, 3, 22–24]. These techniques
usually require repetitive calls to a model checker or a solver. Dfence is a dy-
namic analysis tool that falls into this category. Our work differs from Dfence
as ours is a fully static approach as compared to the dynamic approach used by
Dfence. A direct comparison with Dfence cannot be made. However, we have
implemented their approach in our framework and we present an experimental
comparison using our re-implementation.
Memorax [3] and Remmex [22, 23] also fall into the category of property-
driven tools. Memorax [1] computes all possible minimal-hitting-set solutions.
Though it computes the smallest possible solution, exhaustively searching for
all possible solutions can make such an approach slow. Moreover, Memorax
requires that the input program is written in rmm — a special purpose language.
Alg. 2 captures what Memorax would do if it has to find only one solution.
Remmex also falls in the category of property-driven tools and their approach
is given as Alg. 2.
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[xi = 0; yi = 0; ]
n
s1 = 0; s2 = 0;[
xi = 1;
s1+=yi;
]n
‖
[
yi = 1;
s2+=xi;
]n
assert(s1 + s2 >= 0);
Fig. 2: A parameterized program. Here, [st]n denotes that the statement st is
repeated n times.
Bounded model checking has been used for the verification of concurrent
programs [6, 27]. In context-bounded model checking [19, 27], the number of
interleavings in counterexamples is bounded, but executions are explored without
depth limit. ROBMC is orthogonal to these ideas, as here the bound is on the
number of event reorderings.
7 Implementation and Experimental Results
7.1 Experimental Setup
To enable comparison between the different approaches, we implemented all four
algorithms in the same code base, using Cbmc [6] as the model checker. Cbmc
explores loops until a given bound. Our implementation and the benchmarks
used are available online at http://www.cprover.org/glue for independent
verification of our results. The tool takes a C program as an input and assertions
in the program as the specification.
Alg. 1 closely approximates the approach used in Dfence [24]. Alg. 2 resem-
bles the approach used in Remmex [22, 23] and a variant of Memorax [1, 3].
We used Minisat 2.2.0 [13] as the SAT solver in Cbmc. For all four algorithms
incremental SAT solving is used. The cardinality constraints used in Alg. 3 and
Alg. 4 are encoded incrementally [25]. Thus, the program is encoded only once
while the ordering constraints are changed in every iteration using the assump-
tion interface of the solver. The experiments were performed on a machine with
8-core Intel Xeon processors and 48 GB RAM. The increaseStrategy(k) used for
algorithms Alg. 3 and Alg. 4 doubles the bound k.
7.2 Benchmarks
Mutual exclusion algorithms such as dekker, peterson [26], lamport [21], dijk-
stra [21] and szymanski [28] as well as ChaseLev [12] and Cilk [16] work stealing
queues were used as benchmarks. All benchmarks have been implemented in C
using the pthread library. For mutual exclusion benchmarks, a shared counter
was added and incremented in the critical section. An assertion was added to
check that none of the increments are lost. In addition, all the benchmarks were
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augmented with a parametric code fragment shown in Fig. 2, which increases
the number of innocent pairs as n is increased. The parameter n was increased
from 2 to 40 with an increment of 2. Thus, each benchmark has 20 parametric
instances, which makes the total number of problem instances for one memory
model 140.
7.3 Results
We ran our experiments for the TSO and PSO memory models for all the in-
stances with the timeout of 600 seconds. From now on, we will refer to Alg. 1 as
Te, Alg. 2 as Fi, Alg. 3 as ROBMC and Alg. 4 as ROBMC-Et. In our experi-
ments we found that all algorithms produce the smallest set of fence placement
for every problem instance. Thus, we will focus our discussion on the relative
performance of these approaches.
Fig. 3a shows the effect of changing the value of the parameter K1 in ROBMC
and ROBMC-Et. Remember that the bound is increased gradually from K1 to
K2. Here, K2 is always set to the total number of statement pairs in the program
to guarantee soundness. Te and Fi do not have a parameter K1, and thus, their
corresponding plots are flat. Fig. 3a shows that ROBMC and ROBMC-Et solve
far more instances than Te and Fi. The gap is even wider for the PSO memory
model, which allows more reordering, and thus the number of innocent pairs
are significantly higher compared to TSO on the same program. As expected,
ROBMC-Et performs better, due to the early termination optimization. The
value of K1 barely affects the number of solved instances. The moderate down-
ward trend for the plots as K1 increases suggests that as K1 increases, ROBMC
tends to behave more and more like Fi.
Fig. 3b shows the increase in the total number of statement pairs that can
potentially be reordered as the parameter n (Fig. 2) increases for the Peterson
algorithm. As expected, the number of pairs grows quadratically in n. For PSO,
the increase is steeper, as PSO allows more reordering than TSO. This explains
the better performance of the ROBMC approaches on PSO.
The log-scale scatter plot in Fig. 3c compares the run-time of ROBMC-Et
with K1 = 5 with Fi over all 280 problem instances. Fi times out significantly
more often (data points where both time out are omitted). Even on the instances
solved by both the approaches, ROBMC-Et clearly outperforms Fi on all but
a few instances. Those instances where Fi performs better typically have very
few innocent pairs. Note that the queries generated by ROBMC-Et are more
expensive, as our current implementation uses cardinality constraints to enforce
boundedness. Thus, it is possible for Fi to sometimes perform better even though
it generates a larger number of queries to the underlying model checker.
The semi-log-scale plot in Fig. 3d gives the number of queries to the model
checker required by the approaches for the peterson algorithm on TSO. Te and
Fi generate exponentially many queries to the model checker as n increases.
By contrast, the number of queries generated by ROBMC and ROBMC-Et
virtually remains unaffected by n. This is expected as the search is narrow and
focussed owing to the bound k.
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Fig. 3e and Fig. 3f give the relative performance of all the algorithms when
the size and number of innocent pairs increases with the parameter n. All plots
show an exponential trajectory, indicating that ROBMC does not fundamen-
tally reduce the complexity of the underlying problem. Even though the number
of queries required remains constant (Fig. 3d), each such query becomes more
expensive because of the cardinality constraints.
However, the growth rate for ROBMC and ROBMC-Et is much slower com-
pared toTe and Fi. Fig. 3e and Fig. 3f corroborate the claim that ROBMC-based
approaches perform much better when there are a significant number of inno-
cent pairs. For PSO, the performance gained by using ROBMC is even higher, as
PSO allows more reordering. Similar trends are observed for dijkstra algorithm
in Figs. 3g and 3h. Plots in Figs. 3g and 3i as well as Figs. 3h and 3j show
that the performance of ROBMC-based approaches is not highly sensitive to the
value of K1 as it changes from 5 to 10. This is consistent with the observation
made from Fig. 3a.
The performance comparision for the ChaseLev work stealing queue is given
in Figs. 3k and 3l. Here it can be seen that the threshold (in terms of inno-
cent pairs) needed for ROBMC to surpass other approaches is higher. Even for
such a case, ROBMC still provides competitive performance when the number
of innocent pairs are low. ROBMC regains its superiority towards the end as the
number of innocent pairs increases. Thus, even when every individual query is
more expensive (due to the current implementation that uses cardinality con-
straints to enforce the bound), ROBMC always provides almost equal or better
performance for all the benchmarks.
8 Concluding Remarks
ROBMC is a new variant of Bounded Model Checking that has not been ex-
plored before. Our experimental results indicate substantial speedups when ap-
plying ROBMC for the automated placement of fences on programs with few
culprit pairs and a large number of innocent pairs. In particular, we observe
that the speedup obtained by using ROBMC increases when targeting a weaker
architecture. Thus, ROBMC adds a new direction in bounded model checking
which is worth exploring further.
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